ABSTRACT
Each
act of the state (or non-state actor) in the international system can have as
many background and structural variables and several precipitating and
accelerating factors that are finally set off by the triggering act of a state
or non-state actor. In attempting to understand events as they occur,
therefore, the scholar has to step back from the triggering act itself and
examine the concatenation of variables and factors that eventually lead up to
the event so as to fully grasp the true picture – as much as that is possible –
and thus gain a deeper insight into the phenomenon under study. In addition,
such encompassing framework provides for the scholar a predictive ability such
that when signs recur, their likelihoods can be prognosticated to some degree
of accuracy. The scholar can also provide counsel on means to avoid recurrence,
where applicable. This paper attempts this task regarding the Yellow Fever
diplomatic situation that engulfed Nigeria and South Africa for the better part
of the month of March, 2012. It dissects the background factors that led to the
fiasco with a bridging elucidation of National Interests which were at the
background of the initial act of the South Africans and in the reciprocal
deportations by the Nigerian government. It also recommends cooperation between
these two African powerhouses for the promotion of their national interests and
the furtherance of a unified African agenda on the world stage.
INTRODUCTION
A
hale of unbridled upbraiding from several quarters in Nigeria greeted the
recent move by the immigration authorities of South Africa. They had, on the 2nd
of March, “deported” 125 Nigerian passengers aboard an Oliver R Tambo
International Airport-bound Arik Air plane on the grounds of them possessing
fake Yellow Fever cards.[1]
From the media and social networks[2]
came an avalanche of reactions from Nigerians that both condemned that action
and demanded an immediate strong, if not stronger, response from the Nigerian
government. The issue, repeatedly placed on the front burners of public opinion
by the print and electronic media, fanned embers of bottled-up empathy for the
maltreatment of Nigerians outside our shores into flames.
The
fact that one of the passengers at the time was a serving senator of the
Federal Republic did nothing to help the situation the “Rainbow nation” found
itself. In fact, it only made matters worse.[3] Feeling
the pulse of the people and determined to avoid the backlash a lacklustre response
might stimulate, the Federal Government moved swiftly with reciprocal actions
of its own. A strongly worded statement from the Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Olugbenga Ashiru that ended up with a threat of severing relationships with
South Africa in the absence of an apology and conciliatory compensation, was succeeded
by the commencement of reciprocal deportations.[4]
In
the flurry of voices that were raised in condemnation of this act, one common
denominator ran through the majority of opinions: National Interest. This
immediately dilates the issue at stake from the myopic perspective of health
concerns and places it right within the nexus of Nigeria’s foreign policy. This
paper is an attempt to examine the concept of national interest without
divorcing it from the Yellow Fever imbroglio but seeing how it fits in the
labyrinth of events that preceded and marked the said altercation.
NATIONAL INTEREST
The
elucidative roots of national interest can be traced back to the realm of
pessimism of 15th century Machiavellianism. It represented a
repudiation of earlier Western sources in Hellenic idealism, Judeo-Christian
biblical morality and the teachings of medieval theologians such as Thomas
Aquinas.[5] Machiavelli
had argued that without sufficient power and the willingness to use it,
splendid moral goals amounted to nothing. Power rather than morality was the
central concept of this school. In addition, state power – especially when
applied for its survival – was neither moral nor immoral but amoral.[6]
Simply
put, the national interest[7] is
the state's goals and ambitions whether economic, military, or cultural. The
pursuit of these interests, a foundational principle of the realist school, is
multifaceted but primarily focussed on the state’s survival, welfare and
security.[8] National
interest is often the answer to the “why” of state actions and it is invoked to
justify virtually every act of the state.[9]
This elusive character of the term is made apparent in the varied perspectives
of existing definitions most of which neither defy consensus nor are
sufficiently consensual.
Kaplan (1967) for instance,
defines it as the interest, which a national actor has in implementing a
defined system of action. Morgenthau (1967) conceives of it simply as politics
among nations. To Jones (1970), national interest is a term used in political
debate within a country to signal the case that the item of policy suggested
will bring benefits not merely to its proponents but also to its opponents.
Frankel (1972) postulates that national interest is a key concept in foreign
policy. In his view, it amounts to the total of all national values, national
in both meaning of the word, both pertaining to the nation and the state.[10]
For
Carl von Clausewitz, all state behaviour is motivated by its need to survive and
prosper. To safeguard its interests of survival and prosperity, and for no
other reason, the state must rationally decide to go to war. However, he was
quick to admonish that unlimited war is foolish, for it serves no national
interest.[11]
Arguably more than any other, the political credentials of Hans Morgenthau
epitomised the realist position on national interests that built on the
position of Niccolo Machiavelli and von Clausewitz.
Taking
Wilsonian idealism[12]
head on was the Morgenthau political Weltanschauung
of international politics being essentially nothing but a struggle for power. Morgenthau’s
theory was normatively a philosophical argument of how states ought to behave.
He was adamant in his position that if states pursue only their rational
self-interests, without defining them too grandly, causes of conflicts with
other states would be reduced to their barest minimum.[13] Even
when these occur, their collisions will be compromisable and easily resolved
through diplomatic channels. However, when states refuse to limit themselves to
protection of their rational self-interests, they become dangerous. By defining
their interests too broadly, leading to a policy of expansionism or imperialism,
a situation would arise where states whose interests are thereby infringed upon
take measures to counter such policy, and this can lead to war. What
Morgenthau’s national-interest-as-power framework provided was a yardstick for
the definition of national interest at any time and under any circumstance. "Using
national interest defined as power, we look over the statesman's shoulder when
he writes his dispatches; we read and anticipate his very thoughts." [14]
In
stating policy as national interests, this position implied that each state
possessed the might to back them up. The policy of failing to back up a
declaration of certain vital interests with the might required – militarily or
otherwise – was considered a potentially dangerous policy. Regarded as a "policy
of bluff", it tended to have two outcomes, neither of which were
favourable: the adversary calls your bluff and persists in undermining your interest
or you belatedly attempt to back up words with prerequisite action to convince
the other party of your seriousness. “A horrifying example is the U.S. policy
of angry words at Japan in the 1930s over its conquest of China, words
unsupported by military power or any inclination to use it. Tokyo could simply
not believe that China was a vital U.S. interest; the Americans were bluffing.
Was not poker, the game of bluff, the Americans' favourite card game?”[15]
Levels
and Types of National Interest
Morgenthau
identified two levels of national interest, vital interests and secondary
interests. Vital interests concern the very life of the state and every
effort must be expended to ensure the preservation of that life. Even if it
came to war, there was to be no compromise or hesitation to engage whenever the
life of the state was threatened. These interests were easy to enunciate:
security of a state’s independence and freedom and the protection of its
institutions, people and fundamental values. This implied pre-emptive action
when necessary to curtail any state with expansionist tendencies well in
advance of the period where those tendencies will begin to constitute a virile
threat. In fact, Morgenthau paraphrased Machiavelli with the assertion that imperialist
powers that threaten your interests are best dealt with early and always with adequate
power.[16]
Unlike
vital interests, secondary interests are not as easy to define. These are
interests over which one may seek to compromise as they are mostly removed from
one’s borders and of themselves, present no threat to the sovereignty of the
state. However, there is the caveat that these interests bear the potentiality
to attain vital status. Secondary interests are the grounds for statesmen to
negotiate mutually advantageous deals in as much as the other party is not
engaged in an expansionist policy.
Realists
also distinguish between temporary
and permanent interests, specific and general interests and complementary
and conflicting interests. These
interests tend to crisscross several actions and or inactions of states in the
interplay of their interactions with other actors in the international system. Advocating
for the defence of human rights in a distant land would be an instance of permanent,
general and secondary interests because of the advocating state’s long-term
commitment to human rights but not too specific or conflicting to impair the
former’s overall relations with friendly states or weaken its power by any
means. For instance, the United States ought to consider it absurd, in national
interests terms, to advance a hostile relationship with China over human rights
as too little good and much harm would be the consequence. A hostile China
would not offer America that much needed help in dealing with the aggressive
nuclear-armed North Korea. Thus, human rights in China can be compromised for
the more important goal of restraining a bellicose country that threatens U.S.
allies. In this crisscrossing of interests, the policy-makers must always
choose between competing interests.[17]
These
levels and types are so tenuous that no two states, even allies, have identical
national interests. At best, they can hope that their interests would
complement one the other.
National
Interest and Foreign Policy
As
aforementioned, statesmen justify foreign policy on the basis of furthering the
national interest of nation states. Acting as a guide, the national interests
directs the attention of policymakers to a category of goals a state’s foreign
policy ought to value most as its national and societal goals. These goals
normatively must advance not just the interests of certain individuals or
groups, rather it must promote the welfare of the country as a whole.[18]
In
other words, the foreign policy of every country is at all times presumably
designed to promote the national interest. Policy makers are laced with the
task of identifying and serving the national interest in the policies they make
for the state’s external interactions. Difficulties rear their head where there
are conflicting interests regarding the national interest and a foreign policy
decision as in the case of a clash of the interest in peace with the interest
in respecting bilateral agreements. It thus behoves policy makers, especially
foreign policy decision makers to bear in mind the concept of national interest
as it aids prioritisation of foreign and domestic policies in the framework of
national policy and provides the antidote against political myopia and
partisanship that may present to the decision makers a false hue. “Finally,
despite variation in meanings, national interests are the constant rather than
the variables of international relations; it is likewise true that developments
at home or abroad require a continual reassessment of those interests.”[19]
DIPLOMATIC FACEOFF
The
exposition of national interest above renders a backdrop against which to
examine the Yellow Fever/yellow card diplomatic tussle between Abuja and Pretoria.
To adequately place it within the concatenation of events that both preceded
and marked it, a brief section shall look at Yellow Fever in the region. Next,
the adduced suppositions that may have causal implications for the undiplomatic
action of the immigration authorities in South Africa towards the Nigerian
passengers will be highlighted and immediately followed by an appraisal about
the need for better relations between these two African nations.
Yellow
Fever[20]
The
Yellow Fever virus is an arbovirus of the flavivirus
genus, and the mosquito is the primary vector. It carries the virus from one
host to another, primarily between monkeys, from monkeys to humans, and from
person to person. Several different species of the Aedes and Haemogogus
mosquitoes transmit the virus. It is referred to sometimes as an acute viral
haemorrhagic disease. The "yellow" in the name refers to the jaundice[21]
that affects some patients.
Up
to 50% of severely affected persons without timely treatment will die from Yellow
Fever. There are an estimated 200,000 cases of Yellow Fever, causing 30,000
deaths worldwide annually. The virus is reportedly endemic in tropical areas of
Africa and South America, with a combined population of over 900 million
people. Over last two decades, the number of Yellow Fever cases has increased
due to declining population immunity to infection, deforestation, urbanization,
population movements and climate change.
There
is no recognised cure for Yellow Fever. Treatment is at best symptomatic, aimed
at reducing the symptoms for the comfort of the patient.[22]
Vaccination remains the most important preventive measure against Yellow Fever.
The vaccine is safe, affordable and highly effective, and appears to provide
protection for 30-35 years[23]
or more. The vaccine provides effective immunity within one week for 95% of
persons vaccinated.
According
to World Health Organization (WHO), there are 14 countries at risk of Yellow
Fever transmission in West Africa. These include Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte
d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea and Guinea-Bissau. Others are Liberia, Mali,
Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. These 14 countries are part of the International
Health Regulations (IHR)[24]
including all the Member States of the World Health Organisation. The aim of
the IHR is to help the international community prevent and respond to acute
public health risks especially those with the potential to cross borders and
threaten people worldwide. One of the downsides of globalisation is that
diseases can spread rapidly via international travel and trade. The health
crisis in one country can impact livelihoods and economies in many other parts
of the world. The aim of the IHR is to limit interference with international traffic
and trade while ensuring public health by tackling the spread of diseases
across borders. Furthermore, the IHR also requires that countries strengthen
their existing capacities for public health surveillance and response.
Anyone
travelling from any of those 14 countries mentioned above or in transit through
any of such countries to any other country is required to tender proof of
vaccination against the fever. The countries that require such proofs are those
where the disease may or may not occur and where the mosquito vector and
potential non-human primate hosts of Yellow Fever are present. Therefore, any
importation of the virus into such countries by infected travellers could
result in its propagation and establishment, leading to a permanent risk of
infection for the human population. High fatality rates among the unvaccinated
means that vaccination is recommended for all travellers visiting areas where
there is a risk of Yellow Fever infection and transmission.
South
Africa is one of the countries where the mosquito vector resides and where potential
non-human primate hosts of Yellow Fever exists. Therefore, she has to take
caution and ensure passengers from endemic countries are safe and not at risks
to import the virus which could result in its propagation and establishment,
leading to a permanent risk of infection for its human population.
Given
this scenario, South Africa had cause to be wary of the travellers from the
West of Africa.
That
argument, though incontrovertible in isolation, flies against the face of
reason when situated within the context of the ties that exist between both
nations. As the Foreign Affairs Minister argued, appropriate diplomatic
channels were ignored by the South African immigration authorities. Where
necessary, if the fears were actual, the passengers should have been
quarantined and inoculated at their expense. This would have been
understandable, for the Federal Minister of Health, given the fact that there
was no immediate endemic threat of the virus in Nigeria and Nigeria’s last case
of the epidemic was in 1995. Nonetheless, if the deportation proved to be of
extreme necessity, then the embassy ought to have been informed. Furthermore,
suspicions of insincerity about the real issues at stake were heightened by the
fact that the Nigerians who were deported had been issued valid visas for the
trip and the process of obtaining such visas usually involved the prerequisite
inclusion of valid International Certificates of Vaccination without which a
traveller risked visa denial.
These
issues necessitate an analysis of background factors that may have been at the
root of this deportation embroilment.
Background
factors
Long
before this recent spat, not a few Nigerians, who were painfully aware of the
individual and collective sacrifice of the country for the independence of
South Africa, considered South Africans as ungrateful. This sentiment, often
expressed in low tones, rose in crescendo during the xenophobic attacks in 2008.
Many Nigerians lost friends and family to attacks that were unashamedly unprovoked
and decidedly discriminatory. The pain can best be understood by a detour down
memory lane.
Post-independence
Nigeria’s primary African commitment was to liberate the continent from the
last vestiges of colonialism and to eradicate apartheid in South Africa. This drive
for African liberation had grown from a weak and conservative stance during the
1960s to an increasingly firm push after the civil war. Murtala Muhammad most
actively pursued this Nigerian commitment after successfully backing the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola's (MPLA)
ascent to power in Angola in 1975 by providing the swing vote in the Organisation
of African Unity (OAU)[25]
decision to recognize the MPLA. Nigeria had also played a similar role in the
independence of Zimbabwe and the late 1980s saw her active in assisting
Nambibia to achieve independence in Namibia. In the latter case, it contributed
about US$20 million to assist the South West Africa People's Organization in
the 1989 elections and other preparations for Namibian independence. The
country also contributed financially to liberation movements in South Africa
and to the front line states of Zambia, Tanzania, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe
giving military and financial aid to the African National Congress (ANC) for
its efforts against the apartheid regime in South Africa and provided military
equipments to Mozambique to help its struggle against South African-backed
guerrillas.[26]
Monies,
resources and efforts that may have been put to use at home were being used to fight
for the liberation of Africa and Africans across the continent. Though most Nigerians
remain proud of their forthright stance against apartheid many more feel that
post-apartheid South Africa shows insufficient gratitude for its role.[27]
This sentiment was fiercely expressed again when the deportation news filtered
through the airwaves. It was flagrantly obvious. South Africans were too
ungrateful to bear.[28]
Adamu
Adamu has laid this position of South African ingratitude to rest in a recent
article.[29]
Therein, he brilliantly argues against the continued resort to past assistance
that indirectly serves to perpetually place the recipient of our generosity in a
subservient position for life. Helping to liberate Southern Africa
was a duty based on the truth that the continent will never be truly free until
each country is independent. There must be freedom for all or none for any. Therefore,
he averred, helping South Africa liberate itself is merely helping our own
independence attain maturity and have meaning for us and for every victim of
oppression. Is it for this that we want thanks?
Analogically,
he enquires:
…what gratitude do we expect from
the beneficiaries of our duty? How many times do we ask members of our family
to bow down before us in thanksgiving for our feeding and protecting them? Moreover,
even if this type of gratitude they seek is truly due from South Africa, do we
have to remind them every day of what we have done to them? An act of kindness
that expects--and especially if it does demand-an expression of gratitude
becomes an unkind act, a painful gift that keeps its recipient an eternal
prisoner to its benefaction.
That was certainly not what
Nigerian patriots meant to do to South Africa in its hour of need…Nigeria
stands in danger of vitiating its good works with those getting endless
reminders, demands for, and expectations of eternal praise and constant
honourable mention from beneficiaries of its goodness. In this and in all other
things, goodness is its own reward and stands in no need for eternal
thankfulness.[30]
With
the incessant calls for gratitude from the South Africans quietened, the coast
is clear to embark upon an exploration of other issues that remain pertinent to
our goal here; issues that have pitted the South Africans at daggers drawn with
Nigeria.
Permanent
Seat at the United Nations Security Council
Nigeria
has left no one in doubt about her intentions of securing a permanent seat with
veto powers in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).[31]
In that bid, South Africa is her principal rival.
The
United Nations Organisation was established in 1945 at the end of the Second
World War As part of their roles in the victory, the major allies negotiated
themselves into the Security Council which is the most powerful organ of the UN
because of the veto power wielded by its members. The Security Council is
charged with the maintenance of peace and security among nations. Chapter 7 of
the Charter empowers it to enforce the decisions of the body and it has the
power to make compelling decisions on member governments. The Council is
composed of five permanent members with veto and double veto powers including China,
France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States of America; and other
elected non – permanent members that run for two years.[32]
Barely
10 years into the formation of the UNO, calls were being made for change in its
structure. The clamour for reforms have been particularly directed at the need
to make the organisation more democratic and representative of the diverse
peoples of the world. This it can achieve by increasing the number of permanent
member of the UNSC to accommodate representatives of parts of the world that hitherto
have not had such representation, like Africa. “In addition, the Security
Council does not reflect the realities and challenges of global geopolitics. If
any reforms should be implemented at the UN, they must include the
restructuring of the membership of the Security Council.”[33] Two
proposals were submitted by those charged with identifying how the required
changes can be effected.
Proposal A recommends six
additional permanent seats in the Security Council in addition to the current
permanent five. It was assigned as follows; two to Africa, two to Asia, (Japan
and India prescriptively), one to Europe (Germany prescribed) and one to Latin
America (Brazil, prescribed). These new six were to also possess the veto
power. Proposal B recommends creating eight rotating two-years term seat (non-
permanent) with the four regions above having two seats each.[34]
While
the G4, the four main aspirants for the new Security Council seats, are
fine-tuning strategies for the realisation of their aspirations, the battle for
a potential African seat on the UNSC has been a major source of contention
between South Africa and Nigeria. The latter believes that as the most populous
African nation, her permanent membership on the UNSC would more proportionately
represent the African continent. South Africa, as the most economically
advanced country in Africa, on the other hand contends that a seat for the
“Rainbow nation” could signify increase economic possibilities for UN
operations in Africa.
The
Chair of the African Union Commission[35]
The
position of the chair of the African Union Commission, held since 2008 by
Gabonese Jean Ping, and other key posts in the Commission were expected to be
filled by winners of fresh elections held in January this year. Those elections
were postponed. The postponement was at the instance of South Africa’s
insistence on a single tenure for holders of the position of chair. The implied
thrust of this position is to render ineligible the incumbent whom many states
in the continent believe performed creditably in his first term. Ping, who had
served as Gabon’s Foreign Minister and as former president of the UN General
Assembly,[36]
had the backing of big continental players like Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya and the
AUC host country, Ethiopia. South Africa’s insistence was predicated on her
desire to present a consensus candidature of the Southern African Development
Community (SADC) for the post in the person of Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma,
South Africa’s incumbent Minister of Home Affairs. On her part, Nigeria had
cogent reasons for not supporting this bid.
Mr.
Georges Chikoti, Foreign Affairs Minister of Angola, who presented the consensual
choice of Dr. Dlamini-Zuma, had based her candidature on the argument that the
SADC bloc had not had the opportunity on the level of the AUC to direct affairs.
Contrary to that averment, it shall be recalled that the 8th Secretary-General
of the OAU who is the longest serving of the organisation (from September 1989
to September 2001), Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim, was a national of Tanzania, an SADC
member-state. “Chikoti’s claim was seen by many as a deliberate attempt by
South Africa to create crisis where there is none.
Historically,
the only sub-region yet to chair the pan-African organisation since the more
than 50 years of existence is North Africa and if any state can legitimately
insist on its turn, it should come from that sub-region whose members presently
contribute close to 50% of the organisation's annual budget. It is thus
dishearteningly unbecoming of South Africa to have created the sort of debacle
that led to electoral deadlock and postponement. In addition, from a region
whose member-national had had 12 unbroken years as chair of the OAU, such
actions were least expected. For a level playing ground for all sub-regions,
the Central African Region, which nominated Dr. Ping, should also be given an
opportunity for a second term as provided by AU rules.[37] Ping
also needs a second tenure, as is the practice globally, to consolidate on his
achievements first time round most remarkable of which was the completion of a US200
million-dollar AU headquarters. Even Jacob Zuma himself recognises the need for
consolidation of achievements and he is in the running for a second shot at the
top spot.
By
the nomination of Dr. Dlamini-Zuma, South Africa has violated the gentleman’s
agreement by the Union’s leaders that the big five African countries[38] (Nigeria,
South Africa, Libya, Algeria and Egypt, who also double as the main financiers
of the Commission) should not contest for the Chair of the Commission. The
agreement was to ensure that smaller countries were not dominated at the centre
but were given leadership roles and sense of belonging. Only South Africa, the
last to join has ever sought to occupy the seat.
Finally,
there is an integrity issue at stake as well. Dr. Dlamini-Zuma is the ex-wife
and mother of the children of incumbent South African president, Jacob Zuma.
This singular fact, when juxtaposed with the foregoing, leaves a sour taste in
the mouth and, as much as possible, ought to have been avoided. Instead, the
president’s continuing push for his wife to clinch the position has turned the
whole issue into a family soap opera which will set a bad precedence for
subsequent AUC elections. Many now believe there is more to that pressure than
is obvious. Some posit that Zuma’s efforts to ensure are aimed at covering-up
his country’s recent diplomatic blunders in Libya and Cote d’Ivoire, while
others claim Dlamini-Zuma is becoming a serious political threat to her former
husband’s interests. She may become convinced to test her burgeoning popularity
by contesting and even winning the presidency if she remains within the
country’s politics. An outcome Zuma is wont to avoid.[39]
Nigeria’s
Pro-Western Foreign Policy
There
is a charge against Nigeria's foreign policy. It bears a strong Western slant.
In her management of Africa's conflicts, Nigeria has exhibited features of pro-Westernness
and maintenance of the status quo. This bent is, however, not a recent
phenomenon. Aside from Angola where the General Murtala Muhammad's administration
took sides with the pro-Moscow MPLA government,[40]
most other interventions in Africa's conflicts have demonstrated Nigeria's
preference for pro-Western perspectives.[41]
In
the Congo, for instance, it supported the Kasavubu faction. That faction stood
opposed to the Lumumba government which had the tacit backing of Communist Eastern
Europe. It refused to recognise the Polisario Front fighting for the
independence of the 'Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic' from Morocco. Again,
during the Shaba I and II invasions of Mobutu’s Zaire, it supported Western
military intervention and chose not to intervene in the seizure of power by the
pro-Western Hissein Habre forces during the Chadian conflict, though it was part
of the peacekeeping force.[42]
However,
such a categorisation of Nigeria’s foreign policy is jaundiced. It fails to
look at the entire picture but selectively qualifies the whole by an analysis
of an unwholesome part. Several factors have conspired to determine Nigeria’s
foreign policy right from independence in 1960. As the most populous Black
country in the world, she has had to bear, wittingly or unwittingly, the
leadership of the black world. “This led
to Nigeria’s feeling that she had a responsibility far beyond her borders. Some might say beyond her means.” There was little
doubt that the political leadership of the First Republic realized that the
country had a legitimate claim to leadership and also that black people in
Africa and the Diaspora looked up to Nigeria.
Although, in practice, the
Republic of Ghana under Dr. Kwame Nkrumah (1909-1972) painted Nigeria as an
inactive giant with feet of clay, yet Nigeria was not found wanting when it
came to defending the interests of Africans still under colonial domination or
in confronting France when they were determined to continue with the deadly
injurious policy of testing nuclear bombs in the Sahara against the wishes of
African people.
The internal political dynamics
also contributed to the manner in which Nigeria behaved in the foreign
arena. As a federation of contending
political persuasions, consensual position on foreign policy was the rule
rather than the exception. With the
exception of the policy towards Israel which reflected the religious dichotomy
between the North and the South, there was hardly any area of foreign policy in
which the political parties differed.[43]
At
any given time, a country’s foreign policy is intricately related to its
domestic politics and national interests. By implication, therefore, a
country’s national power has direct relevance to its foreign policy. These
elements of national power afford several advantages to the country and are
often key to streamlining her foreign policy goals and objectives. The country
is big and relatively populous with about a quarter of Africa’s populations
south of Sahara. This population constitutes an enticing market for foreign
investment. Her size of and population has bestowed on Nigeria a strategic
advantage. As has her geographical location in the middle Atlantic astride
major trade routes making friendship with Nigeria desirable. Her agricultural
and mineral potential remains competitive with wealth in minerals such as coal,
iron, columbite, petroleum, uranium, bitumen and gas. The educated middle class
on which a democratic regime could be built is considerably sizeable. The only
drawbacks were lack of political direction and cohesion.[44]
However,
South Africa’s view is understandable from the perspective of recent history.
Events on the continent have had the governments of both states in opposing
camps. In the leadership crises in Cote
d’Ivoire, Egypt and especially Libya,
Nigeria and South Africa differed in what they considered the appropriate
response. That the Nigerian position tallied with the Western stand and that
the South African government found itself “losing” out in the eventual outcome,
supporting the “wrong horse” as one commentator put it, did not seat down well with
the South African government. At the height of the political stalemate in Cote
d’Ivoire, South Africa – one of the few states in the incumbent’s camp – caused
a major upheaval that threatened the measure of solidarity in the ECOWAS organisation
when it sent a warship to the region to signal its unequivocal support for the
Gbagbo presidency. This was substantially excoriated by ECOWAS, behind which
South Africa must have seen the hand of Nigeria. The situation did not differ
too much in Egypt and Libya, where Nigeria’s position must have left South
Africa aghast and thus fuelled the pro-Western tag pinned on Nigeria’s foreign
policy.[45]
Leadership
in Africa
By
premising his argument about the root causes of the diplomatic situation
between both countries on the fact that the deportation was merely a
manifestation of a deeper objective, Professor and Director-General of the
Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Bola Akinterinwa avows that South
Africa both aims to assume the mantle of leadership in Africa and leap frog
Nigeria to the UNSC seat. In her attempt at the former, she plans to undermine
Nigeria. One method in the attainment of that singular goal, as the eminent
International Relations scholar posits, is the “cheque-book diplomacy.” This
method entails the debt settlement of African countries that are unable to pay
dues due to the AU. As a result, South Africa generates political patronage
especially outside the Southern African region. That alone could not have been
anything outlandish in the political sphere but, as Akinterinwa evinces, this
becomes a violation of one of the guiding principles of the AU which allows
each region in the continent to solve its regional problems but refer to the
continental organisation in matters that stretch beyond their native regions.[46]
Beyond
that, however, lie other factors.
South
Africa is increasingly being seen as the star of the continent. It boasts the
highest GDP ($363.7 billion in 2010) accounting
for 24% of the continent’s GNP, with strong economic diversity in mining
(almost 19% of the economy), manufacturing, agriculture, real estate, and
financial services. Impressively advanced transportation and utility
infrastructure plus 18-years of stable post-apartheid governance under a
constitutional democracy combine to make South Africa the prime destination and
an example of what an African state can be.
In fact, she has become the economic powerhouse of Africa. To concretise
that assertion, she has been formally invited to join the Brazil, Russia,
India, China (BRIC) quartet, and became a full member during the 2011 BRICS
Summit in Hainan, and has been globally applauded for hosting the comprehensively
successful 2010 FIFA World Cup.[47]
On
the other hand is Nigeria with its predilection for self-destructive
corruption, terrorism and infamously poor leadership. Despite all these,
Nigeria has remained a reference for leadership in the continent powerful
enough to present a virile competition for the Rainbow nation. One factor that
has made this possible at all is size – expressed in terms of geography and
population.
It
must irk the South Africans to no end to know that because of the size factor,
Nigeria has much more in common with the nations of the quartet than she does.
The sheer size of Nigeria’s market and its potential for future economic growth
and consumption more strategically coincide with the attributes of the quartet.
With just about a third of the Nigerian population of approximately a 170
million, South Africa’s inclusion among the BRIC has been called into question
by none other than the Goldman Sachs inventor of the now renowned acronym. Jim
O’Neill expressed his displeasure by firstly stating that South Africa was
included because the grouping failed to strictly base membership on economic
fundamentals instead of pacts of political significance. “It is nowhere near
constituting a BRIC, and without staggering productivity improvements and major
immigration or improvements in birth rates, etc., it is never going to get
there,” he said. He concluded by saying, “South Africa has played on the notion
that because they do have developed markets and Western governing standards in
some areas they’ve said, ‘Look, we are the gateway to the rest of Africa. (…)
What intrigues me is whether other big African countries accept that and I
doubt that Nigeria is going to be very happy about that.”[48]
It
is in such and other means – linked with a particular yellow hue – that South
Africa tries to assume for itself the leadership of Africa..
MIDDLE GROUND[49]
In
seeking a middle ground for the relationship between the two countries, the
concept of a ‘special relationship’[50]
between the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US) is particularly
instructive. In as much as Western phenomena cannot be blindly replicated in
Africa due to different historical trajectories, there are undoubtedly
important ideas that can be drawn from the historical alliance between both
countries. South Africa and Nigeria have expressed no less a desire to
transform the position of Africa in the global order.
Historically,
Nigeria was one of the leading African countries in the anti-apartheid struggle
as seen in her pivotal role in establishing the United Nations Special
Committee against Apartheid in the 1960s. Also, in the involvement of ordinary
Nigerians like students who contributed financially to the anti-apartheid
movement in reaction to the 1976 Soweto uprisings and Nigerian civil servants
who likewise offered portions of their salaries. Nigeria supported the
Frontline States as well through the 1980s and by the end of apartheid in 1994,
it had contributed an estimated US$61 billion towards the anti-apartheid
effort.
The spat between Sani Abacha and
Nelson Mandela in 1995 over the execution of environmental and human rights
activist Ken Saro Wiwa presented the first test of how the two countries would
engage each other as sovereign nations whose foreign policy portrays their national
values. It was not until the arrival of civilian rule under Nigeria’s Olusegun
Obasanjo in 1999 and the simultaneous election of Thabo Mbeki in SA that a
strategic partnership emerged. There appeared to be something special about
Sub-Saharan Africa’s largest economies’ determination to lead in the ‘African
Century.’ A common sense of purpose emerged around the extinguishing of
continental conflicts, reconstruction of the continent’s institutional
architecture and the development of a continental socio-economic blueprint in
the form of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD).[51]
As
we enter the post-Yellow Fever era, this relationship is unsatisfactorily
limping along. The Bi-National Commission (BNC) established in 1999 to
facilitate the efficient management of the relationship has not met since 2009
soured by South Africa’s refusal to grant a visa waiver to Nigerian officials
and diplomats. The BNC was supposed to convene in 2010 but those background
factors enumerated above worked to prevent that from occurring. It is
heart-warming that the government of both nations have now agreed to revive
these annual talk-shops that discuss the possibility of strengthening economic
and trade relations between the two states.[52]
During
a roundtable on Nigeria’s foreign policy hosted by the South African Institute
of International Affairs (SAIIA) and the Nigerian Peoples Democratic Institute
(PDI) in Abuja in October of 2010, young Nigerian scholars and politicians
wanted to know what the Nigerian people had to show for their country’s
extensive involvement in continental and global peace-building, to which
Nigeria has diverted billions of dollars since independence. Similar questions
are being asked in South Africa.
Both
countries have to define the overarching goal to which they are both staunchly
committed. During the Cold War, Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan had to
centre their ‘special relationship’ on the conviction that Communism was the
biggest threat to their existence. Here, the common agenda that ought to be the
conviction that poverty is a serious threat to the existence of both these
countries. Poverty eradication is the critical precursor to changing the
position of Africa in the global order. Neither country can export to the
continent what it does not have at home.
There
are obvious economic benefits for cooperation between both countries. South
African firms like MTN, DSTv, Standard Bank, Protea Hotels, Shoprite,
Woolsworth and Game have thrived in Nigeria and contributed towards employment,
revenue generation and improved quality of goods and services. Likewise,
Nigerian companies like Oando Nigeria and Dangote Group have made inroads into
the Johannesburg Securities Exchange and the cement industry respectively, thus
adding to SA’s investment appeal. This indicates that there can be a plethora
of advantages for both countries, and the continent, should they decide on a
special relationship with a goal in mind.
When
pressed by the British media to redefine their special relationship with the
US, British premier, David Cameron stated that the relationship remained
“strong, because it delivers for both of us...this is a partnership of choice
that serves our national interests today.” It is instructive to note that
surveys have often shown the British public to be averse to playing second
fiddle to the US. Nigeria and South Africa would do well to learn about the
importance of taking citizens on board so that sharp practices by unpatriotic
elements on both sides do not jeopardise the cordiality and thus limit the
potential for decent and law-abiding citizens to benefit from this
relationship. Nigeria and South Africa should, as a matter of urgency, accept
their interdependence and resolve to handle diplomatic relations according to
laid down procedures that will engender the flourishing of mutual respect. Only
then can a special relationship begin to have more substantive meaning for the
lives of ordinary South Africans, Nigerians and Africans as a whole.
Points
to note
·
It is in her National Interest to
request for a fresh Yellow Fever risk assessment from the WHO to fast track the
removal of the country's name from the list of states given the fact that the
last reported case was as far back as 1995.
·
As tenuous as it may have been for this
to result in such an altercation between these two states, it is apposite for
Nigeria to put measures in place to forestall a recurrence elsewhere which
ought to begin with the dismantling of the ring of fake yellow card vendors in
and around the airports.
·
The position of eminent laureate, Wole
Soyinka, in his critique of Senghor's negritude is as apt here as it was point-blank
in that instance. "A tiger does not boast about its tigritude. It simply
pounces on the prey." A virile state needs not beat its chest in any
challenge posed by another. Rather, the latter would, knowing well the "tigritude"
of the former, apply restrain and seek all channels of diplomatic resolution to
situations as and when they arise because the consequences may be dire should
the former pounce. By implication, this happened in the first place because of
the implicit and explicit perspective of Nigeria's position as a sleeping giant
that has consistently failed to rise to its naturally bequeathed position of
leadership in Africa.
·
Some hypothetical questions have been
raised concerning the reciprocal reaction of the Nigerian government. Two of
these are very poignant. Would the government’s response have been as quick and
point blank as it turned out to be in achieving strategic gains such as the
apology from the South African government had a Senator of the Federal Republic
not been involved? Those who ask infer that the weight brought to bear on the
Minister by the Senate was pivotal to the eventual outcome. Secondly, not a few
wonder if the attention given to the matter by the press bore its mark in the
end. In the end, many Nigerians wonder that if we may be witnessing the
beginning of a new face to Nigeria’s foreign policy where her “tigritude”
is front and centre.
CONCLUSION
The
Yellow Fever case between South Africa and Nigeria may have come and gone but
it remains a point of reference in the immediate historical trial of the
relationship between these two African superpowers. A singular event though it
was, it triggered off a series of actions that threatened to imperil not just
the relationship between Nigeria and South Africa but the livelihoods of many
who would have been caught up in the crossfire – had things degenerated out of
control. It is to the advantage of the two states and the “efficient”
diplomatic machinery at work that far worse scenarios did not play out but the
situation was immediately brought under control and resolved with comparatively
quick despatch. The formal public apology demanded of the South African government
by Nigeria was pronounced and a
delegation from the former visited the latter to “smooth things over.” Several
steps were taken most important of which was the resumption of the annual Bi-National
Commission talk-shops between the two vice-presidents. Pretoria’s unprecedented
support, projection and campaign for Nigeria’s Finance Minister is an
indication that, to a large extent, the Yellow Fever’s row is over.
However,
this paper, based on the conviction that the Yellow Fever incident was merely
the manifestation of a series of covert underpinnings, strove to analyse the
actions of the actors involved based on their national interests motivations.
In accomplishing that, the paper examined the concept of National Interest as
understood in International Relations and analysed the diplomatic faceoff
between the two states providing as much evidence as is available on issues
behind the news that may have forced the hand of the immigration authorities to
inevitably “deport” the Nigerian passengers on board the Arik Airline on that
fateful day.
In
analysing National Interest, it was established that each and every state act
in its action, reaction, inaction and interaction with other states can be
construed as coming from the state’s criterion of what constitutes its national
interest, at the time. When extrapolated to bear on this Yellow Fever instance,
a wide array of possibilities open up for consideration. South Africa’s apology
showed that Nigeria’s threat was not a "policy of bluff" but had telling
consequences especially for their business concerns in the country.
However,
such cloak and dagger encounters can best be avoided. As discussed the
subsection Middle Ground, cooperation and mutual respect akin to the “special
relationship” existing between the US and the UK ought to guide actions, reactions
and interactions between these two erstwhile sister nations. Thus, both ought
to eschew clandestine acts that undermine the authority of either and work
together acknowledging the strength in numbers and the advantages of their
interdependence to the promotion of the African agenda on the global arena.
This is to the better advancement their national interests.[53]
[1] Known
as the International Certificate of Vaccination or Prophylaxis, the yellow card
is issued by health authorities of individual states. See: Kemi Ajumobi,
Concern mounts over SA, Nigeria ‘Yellow Fever card’ imbroglio,
http://www.businessdayonline.com/NG/index.php/analysis/126-health/34169-concern-mounts-over-sa-nigeria-yellow-fever-card-imbroglio,
sourced 20th March, 2012.
“The press statement issued by Arik said South African
health authorities gave the reason as incorrect or unrecognised batch numbers
on the documentation which is mandatory proof before entry and described the
protocol as "irregular and obfuscating” and accused the authorities of
arbitrariness.” See: Ike Anya, On Yellow Fever, yellow cards, Nigeria and South
Africa, http://www.nigeriahealthwatch.com/2012/03/on-yellow-fever-yellow-cards-nigeria.html,
sourced 20th March, 2012 (Hereafter, “Ike Anya, On Yellow Fever,
yellow cards, Nigeria and South Africa”).
[2] The
Chairman of the House of Representatives on Diaspora Affairs, Abike
Dabiri-Erewa tweeted that the action of the South African authorities was
“unacceptable, pathetic, degrading, unfair and un-African.” See: Ike Anya, On Yellow
Fever, yellow cards, Nigeria and South Africa.
[3] It
quickly became a curious case of both approbation and reprobation, a contradiction
in terms. For, if those very same certificates were considered valid enough to
merit their holders a visa to travel to South Africa, how then did they become
invalidated during the course of their journey to be refused by another agency
of the very same government that considered them valid in the first instance?
See comments under the report: John Ameh, Oluwole Josiah and Friday Olokor, FG
faults S’Africa’s claim on Yellow Fever cards … deports 16 more South Africans,
http://odili.net/news/source/2012/mar/7/828.html, sourced 20th
March, 2012.
[4] Some reports put the total number of
South Africans deported during the diplomatic furore at 136.
[5]
The notion of the national interest soon came to dominate European politics
that became fiercely competitive over the next centuries. It is a form of
reason "born of the calculation and the ruse of men" and makes of the
state "a knowing machine, a work of reason"; the state ceases to be
derived from the divine order and is henceforth subject to its own particular
necessities. States could now openly embark on wars purely out of
self-interest. In fact, mercantilism can be seen as the economic justification
of the aggressive pursuit of the national interest. “National Interest,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_interest,
sourced 18th March, 2012.
[6]
Michael G. Roskin, National Interest: From Abstraction To Strategy, www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub356.pdf,
sourced 20th March, 2012 (Hereafter, Michael G. Roskin, National
Interest: From Abstraction To Strategy).
[7] “Competition
to define the national interest is often intense, because while the goals and
values that a state may pursue are virtually endless, the same is not true for
the resources needed to realize them. Decisions must constantly be made about
which goals to emphasize and which to neglect. The definition given to the
national interest is a major factor affecting which values will be favoured.
This is because not all foreign policies (and, therefore, the values that they
protect) are compatible with a given definition of national interest.” Ikedinma
H.A., Foreign Policy Analysis,
www.nou.edu.ng/noun/NOUN_OCL/pdf/pdf2/INR%20321.pdf (Hereafter, “Ikedinma H.A.,
Foreign Policy Analysis”).
[8]
“National Interest,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_interest, sourced 18th
March, 2012.
[9] Ikedinma
H.A., Foreign Policy Analysis.
[10] Ibid.
[11]
Michael G. Roskin , National Interest: From Abstraction To Strategy
[12] Idealism emphasizes international
law, morality, and international organizations, rather than power alone, as key
influences on international events. Idealists think that human nature is
basically good and see the international system as one based on a community of
states that have the potential to work together to overcome mutual problems.
For Idealists, the principles of International Relations must flow from
morality. Former United States president Woodrow Wilson was a major proponent
of idealism. Joshua S. Goldstein and Jon C. Pevehouse, International Relations,
Boston: Pearson, 2011, p. 43.
[13] It
is pertinent to note that in reality national interest is conducted, directed
or determined by the ruling class or the political elites. It is the power that
the (incumbent government most times) that select, pursue, or operationalise
what a nation’s national interest is. This explains why it varies as regime
changes. For instance, Tunde Idiagbon/Muhammed Buhari’s regime in Nigeria
between 1983 and 1985 considered it, the interest of the nation not to collect
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) World Bank loan in spite of the parlous
state of the Nigerian economy. However, the successor, General Ibrahim Badamosi
Babangida’s regime in 1986 chose to contract the loan (despite its stringent
conditionalities). See: Ikedinma H.A., Foreign Policy Analysis.
[14]
Michael G. Roskin , National Interest: From Abstraction To Strategy
[15] Ibid. This will be treated later in
this paper as it pertains to the crux of the Nigeria/South Africa spat.
[16]
Michael G. Roskin , National Interest: From Abstraction To Strategy
[17]
Ibid.
[18] Ikedinma H.A., Foreign Policy Analysis. “It must be
stressed however that the articulation of the goals does not necessarily
guarantee the successful execution of foreign policy. The extent to which a
foreign policy goal/objective is achieved depends largely on the quality,
character and disposition of policy makers, the prevailing political and
economic circumstances, the resource endowments of the state, the military
capability, geographical location, population and a host of other factors.” Ikedinma H.A., Foreign Policy Analysis.
[19]
Ibid. It is worth noting that there are some other issues bordering National
Interests. Issues like National Interest versus Societal Interest (where a
segment of society can come to dominate and control the policy process to the
point where its views, and only its views, shape the content of foreign
policy), National Interest versus Global Interest (where the near incompatibility
of both has more, but not all, realists advocating for preferential
consideration given to the latter rather than the former) and the Long-,
Middle- and Short-term goals of National Interest are not explicated in full
here. These areas of National Interested delineated here were considered
pertinent to the term of this paper.
[20]
Except otherwise stated, information in this subsection was obtained from this
source: Dr Aminu Magashi,
Nigeria: Yellow Fever - Beyond Diplomatic Fiasco,
http://allafrica.com/stories/201203200498.html, sourced 20th March,
2012 (Hereafter, “Dr Aminu Magashi, Nigeria: Yellow Fever – Beyond Diplomatic
Fiasco”).
[21] Refers to a yellowing of the skin
and whites of the eyes.
[22] Known symptoms from range from
nausea and vomiting to internal bleeding, meningitis, jaundice and eventual
kidney failure.
[23] The Nigerian Minister of Health,
Prof. Onyebuchi Chukwu, put it at 10 years.
[24] The International Health Regulations
(IHR) is an international
legal instrument that is binding on 194 countries across the globe.
[25] Now known as the African Union (AU)
[26]
“FOREIGN RELATIONS” http://countrystudies.us/nigeria/80.htm, sourced 22nd
March, 2012.
[27] John
Campbell, South Africa and Nigeria’s Edgy Relationship,
http://blogs.cfr.org/campbell/2012/03/12/south-africa-and-nigerias-edgy-relationship,
sourced 20th March, 2012.
[28]
“Passion was so inflamed that some Nigerians even urged their government to
start demanding certificates from travellers from South Africa to show they
were clear of HIV/Aids. Their misplaced argument was that South Africa was a
major centre of the epidemic - with infection rates running at about 11%
nationally - whereas Yellow Fever had been eradicated in Nigeria.” Sola Odunfa,
African viewpoint: Yellow Fever and family demands,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17338672, sourced 20th March,
2012.
[29] Adamu
Adamu, Nigeria: Endless Talk of Favours,
http://allafrica.com/stories/201203230303.html, sourced 20th March,
2012.
[30] Ibid.
[31] In May last year, when the United
Nations Secretary-General, Ban Ki-Moon, visited Nigeria, President Goodluck
Jonathan minced no words to state categorically, “Mr. Secretary-General, given
the realities of today’s world, a comprehensive reform of the UN system is
imperative at this time… A situation where Africa is totally excluded from the
permanent membership of the Council is unfair and untenable. It is therefore my
hope that the UN system will support Nigeria’s quest for permanent membership of
the UN Security Council.”
[32]
A. S. Akpotor and P. E. Agbebaku, The United Nations Reforms and Nigeria’s
Quest for a Permanent Seat
[33] Levi
Obijiofor, Should Nigeria be a Member of the Security Council?, http://www.nigeriaplus.com/should-nigeria-be-a-member-of-the-security-council/,
sourced 20th March, 2012.
[34] Ibid.
[35]
Except otherwise stated, information in this subsection was obtained from this
source: Alexander Ojo, South Africa and the election of AU Commission chair, http://www.dailytrust.com.ng/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=155905:south-africa-and-the-election-of-au-commission-chair&catid=14:international&Itemid=15,
sourced 20th March, 2012.
[36]
‘How Nigeria can get AU commission chair’,
http://sturvs.com/321005/‘how-nigeria-can-get-au-commission-chair’, sourced 20th
March, 2012.
[37] South African president, Jacob Zuma,
to divert attention from the crucial issues at hand tried to play the lingual
card claiming that the issue was an example of the worn out tussle between
Anglophone and Francophone African states. The truth, however, is that most
states backing Dr. Ping’s tenure continuation are in fact Anglophone, even as
he is from Francophone Central Africa.
[38] There is the suggestion in some
quarters that Ethiopia, as the Headquarters of the Union and Union capital of
the continent, should join this group as well.
[39]
As can be
seen from the information on this web page - http://www.home-affairs.gov.za/ -
the Ministry of Home Affairs, headed by the very same Dr Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma
who did not get the backing of Nigeria for the position of AUC chair and was
responsible for the “bickering” that led to the indecorous postponement of
those elections, is in charge of all immigration services. What implications
this has for the causal factors of that singular case of undiplomatic
deportations is crystal. There was indeed some bad blood and an odiferous
stench of foul play.
[40] The Angolan situation where Nigeria
supported pro-Soviet forces is explained by the fact that South African support
for Biafran secessionist rebels during Nigeria's civil war decidedly influenced
the Murtala Muhammad administration in supporting the MPLA forces in Angola.
[41]
John Amfami Ayam, Review of Nigerian Foreign Policy Towards Africa: Continuity
and Change by Akiba Okon, http://www.jstor.org/stable/161477, sourced 20th
March, 2012.
[42] Ibid.
[43] Jide
Osuntokun, Survey of Nigeria’s foreign policy -2,
http://www.thenationonlineng.net/2011/index.php/columnist/thursday/jide-osuntokun/35374-survey-of-nigeria’s-foreign-policy-2.html,
sourced 20th March, 2012.
[44] Ibid.
[45] South Africa cold reception of IMF’s
Christine Lagarde might also be a clear
signal that unlike some countries in the continent like Nigeria, Ghana, Cameroun,
Guinea and Chad, she was not in the least amenable to the coercive preachments of Western “overlords”
with the singular purpose of obtaining the necessary funds to sustain an ailing
Europe. See: South Africa snubs IMF’s Christine Lagarde!, http://www.newsrescue.com/2012/01/south-africa-snubs-imfs-christine-lagarde/#axzz1q9huzFlY,
sourced 20th March, 2012.
[46]
Chikodi Okereocha, Nigeria-South Africa Diplomatic Row: The Morning After, http://www.tellng.com/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=1192:nigeria-south-africa-diplomatic-row-the-morning-after&Itemid=125,
sourced 20th March, 2012.
[47]
James Kimer, Nigeria-South Africa Diplomatic Spat Highlights Growing Regional
Rivalry, http://www.nigeriaintel.com/2012/03/09/nigeria-south-africa-diplomatic-spat-highlights-growing-regional-rivalry,
sourced 20th March, 2012 (Hereafter, “James Kimer, Nigeria-South
Africa Diplomatic Spat Highlights Growing Regional Rivalry”).
[48] Ibid.
[49]
Except otherwise stated, the information in this subsection is from this
source: Dr Ngwenya, Giants of Africa Limp Along – South Africa and Nigeria,
http://www.saiia.org.za/sa-foreign-policy-african-drivers-opinion/giants-of-africa-limp-along-south-africa-and-nigeria.html,
sourced 20th March, 2012.
[50] The
phrase ‘special relationship’ was coined by former British Prime Minister
Winston Churchill in 1946. It is underpinned mainly by a common historical,
political and economic vision. Churchill saw it as the embodiment and promotion
of values shared by the two major English-speaking powers. At its best, the
relationship facilitated co-operation to end World War II and at its worst, it
culminated in George W Bush and Tony Blair launching an illegal war in Iraq. It
has endured through various Republican and Democratic administrations in the US
and Tory and Labour governments in the UK.
[51] Dr
Ngwenya, Giants of Africa Limp Along – South Africa and Nigeria,
http://www.saiia.org.za/sa-foreign-policy-african-drivers-opinion/giants-of-africa-limp-along-south-africa-and-nigeria.html,
sourced 20th March, 2012.
[52] The
potential of the BNC cannot be overstated, especially when viewed with regard
to the possibility of combining resources and intelligence to fight
transnational crime. Crime and immigration concerns are some of the areas that affect
South Africa/Nigeria relations and so concerted efforts to addressing these
issues would provide opportunity for the two states to deepen cooperation and
promote economic development. Uyo Salifu, South Africa-Nigeria Tensions:
Whither Cooperation for Common African interests?, http://www.igd.org.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=138:south-africa-nigeria-tensions-whither-cooperation-for-common-african-interests&catid=18:in-focus&Itemid=1,
sourced 20th March, 2012.
[53] It should be noted that though
efforts were made not to mention it in this paper, South Africa has its fair
share of the poor and its cadre of corrupt politicians.
No comments:
Post a Comment