Monday, April 23, 2012

Of Yellow Fever and National Interest: The South Africa/Nigeria Diplomatic Imbroglio


ABSTRACT
Each act of the state (or non-state actor) in the international system can have as many background and structural variables and several precipitating and accelerating factors that are finally set off by the triggering act of a state or non-state actor. In attempting to understand events as they occur, therefore, the scholar has to step back from the triggering act itself and examine the concatenation of variables and factors that eventually lead up to the event so as to fully grasp the true picture – as much as that is possible – and thus gain a deeper insight into the phenomenon under study. In addition, such encompassing framework provides for the scholar a predictive ability such that when signs recur, their likelihoods can be prognosticated to some degree of accuracy. The scholar can also provide counsel on means to avoid recurrence, where applicable. This paper attempts this task regarding the Yellow Fever diplomatic situation that engulfed Nigeria and South Africa for the better part of the month of March, 2012. It dissects the background factors that led to the fiasco with a bridging elucidation of National Interests which were at the background of the initial act of the South Africans and in the reciprocal deportations by the Nigerian government. It also recommends cooperation between these two African powerhouses for the promotion of their national interests and the furtherance of a unified African agenda on the world stage.

INTRODUCTION
A hale of unbridled upbraiding from several quarters in Nigeria greeted the recent move by the immigration authorities of South Africa. They had, on the 2nd of March, “deported” 125 Nigerian passengers aboard an Oliver R Tambo International Airport-bound Arik Air plane on the grounds of them possessing fake Yellow Fever cards.[1] From the media and social networks[2] came an avalanche of reactions from Nigerians that both condemned that action and demanded an immediate strong, if not stronger, response from the Nigerian government. The issue, repeatedly placed on the front burners of public opinion by the print and electronic media, fanned embers of bottled-up empathy for the maltreatment of Nigerians outside our shores into flames.
The fact that one of the passengers at the time was a serving senator of the Federal Republic did nothing to help the situation the “Rainbow nation” found itself. In fact, it only made matters worse.[3] Feeling the pulse of the people and determined to avoid the backlash a lacklustre response might stimulate, the Federal Government moved swiftly with reciprocal actions of its own. A strongly worded statement from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Olugbenga Ashiru that ended up with a threat of severing relationships with South Africa in the absence of an apology and conciliatory compensation, was succeeded by the commencement of reciprocal deportations.[4]
In the flurry of voices that were raised in condemnation of this act, one common denominator ran through the majority of opinions: National Interest. This immediately dilates the issue at stake from the myopic perspective of health concerns and places it right within the nexus of Nigeria’s foreign policy. This paper is an attempt to examine the concept of national interest without divorcing it from the Yellow Fever imbroglio but seeing how it fits in the labyrinth of events that preceded and marked the said altercation.

NATIONAL INTEREST
The elucidative roots of national interest can be traced back to the realm of pessimism of 15th century Machiavellianism. It represented a repudiation of earlier Western sources in Hellenic idealism, Judeo-Christian biblical morality and the teachings of medieval theologians such as Thomas Aquinas.[5] Machiavelli had argued that without sufficient power and the willingness to use it, splendid moral goals amounted to nothing. Power rather than morality was the central concept of this school. In addition, state power – especially when applied for its survival – was neither moral nor immoral but amoral.[6]
Simply put, the national interest[7] is the state's goals and ambitions whether economic, military, or cultural. The pursuit of these interests, a foundational principle of the realist school, is multifaceted but primarily focussed on the state’s survival, welfare and security.[8] National interest is often the answer to the “why” of state actions and it is invoked to justify virtually every act of the state.[9] This elusive character of the term is made apparent in the varied perspectives of existing definitions most of which neither defy consensus nor are sufficiently consensual.
Kaplan (1967) for instance, defines it as the interest, which a national actor has in implementing a defined system of action. Morgenthau (1967) conceives of it simply as politics among nations. To Jones (1970), national interest is a term used in political debate within a country to signal the case that the item of policy suggested will bring benefits not merely to its proponents but also to its opponents. Frankel (1972) postulates that national interest is a key concept in foreign policy. In his view, it amounts to the total of all national values, national in both meaning of the word, both pertaining to the nation and the state.[10]

For Carl von Clausewitz, all state behaviour is motivated by its need to survive and prosper. To safeguard its interests of survival and prosperity, and for no other reason, the state must rationally decide to go to war. However, he was quick to admonish that unlimited war is foolish, for it serves no national interest.[11] Arguably more than any other, the political credentials of Hans Morgenthau epitomised the realist position on national interests that built on the position of Niccolo Machiavelli and von Clausewitz.
Taking Wilsonian idealism[12] head on was the Morgenthau political Weltanschauung of international politics being essentially nothing but a struggle for power. Morgenthau’s theory was normatively a philosophical argument of how states ought to behave. He was adamant in his position that if states pursue only their rational self-interests, without defining them too grandly, causes of conflicts with other states would be reduced to their barest minimum.[13] Even when these occur, their collisions will be compromisable and easily resolved through diplomatic channels. However, when states refuse to limit themselves to protection of their rational self-interests, they become dangerous. By defining their interests too broadly, leading to a policy of expansionism or imperialism, a situation would arise where states whose interests are thereby infringed upon take measures to counter such policy, and this can lead to war. What Morgenthau’s national-interest-as-power framework provided was a yardstick for the definition of national interest at any time and under any circumstance. "Using national interest defined as power, we look over the statesman's shoulder when he writes his dispatches; we read and anticipate his very thoughts." [14]
In stating policy as national interests, this position implied that each state possessed the might to back them up. The policy of failing to back up a declaration of certain vital interests with the might required – militarily or otherwise – was considered a potentially dangerous policy. Regarded as a "policy of bluff", it tended to have two outcomes, neither of which were favourable: the adversary calls your bluff and persists in undermining your interest or you belatedly attempt to back up words with prerequisite action to convince the other party of your seriousness. “A horrifying example is the U.S. policy of angry words at Japan in the 1930s over its conquest of China, words unsupported by military power or any inclination to use it. Tokyo could simply not believe that China was a vital U.S. interest; the Americans were bluffing. Was not poker, the game of bluff, the Americans' favourite card game?”[15]

Levels and Types of National Interest
Morgenthau identified two levels of national interest, vital interests and secondary interests. Vital interests concern the very life of the state and every effort must be expended to ensure the preservation of that life. Even if it came to war, there was to be no compromise or hesitation to engage whenever the life of the state was threatened. These interests were easy to enunciate: security of a state’s independence and freedom and the protection of its institutions, people and fundamental values. This implied pre-emptive action when necessary to curtail any state with expansionist tendencies well in advance of the period where those tendencies will begin to constitute a virile threat. In fact, Morgenthau paraphrased Machiavelli with the assertion that imperialist powers that threaten your interests are best dealt with early and always with adequate power.[16]
Unlike vital interests, secondary interests are not as easy to define. These are interests over which one may seek to compromise as they are mostly removed from one’s borders and of themselves, present no threat to the sovereignty of the state. However, there is the caveat that these interests bear the potentiality to attain vital status. Secondary interests are the grounds for statesmen to negotiate mutually advantageous deals in as much as the other party is not engaged in an expansionist policy.
Realists also distinguish between temporary and permanent interests, specific and general interests and complementary and conflicting interests. These interests tend to crisscross several actions and or inactions of states in the interplay of their interactions with other actors in the international system. Advocating for the defence of human rights in a distant land would be an instance of permanent, general and secondary interests because of the advocating state’s long-term commitment to human rights but not too specific or conflicting to impair the former’s overall relations with friendly states or weaken its power by any means. For instance, the United States ought to consider it absurd, in national interests terms, to advance a hostile relationship with China over human rights as too little good and much harm would be the consequence. A hostile China would not offer America that much needed help in dealing with the aggressive nuclear-armed North Korea. Thus, human rights in China can be compromised for the more important goal of restraining a bellicose country that threatens U.S. allies. In this crisscrossing of interests, the policy-makers must always choose between competing interests.[17]
These levels and types are so tenuous that no two states, even allies, have identical national interests. At best, they can hope that their interests would complement one the other.

National Interest and Foreign Policy
As aforementioned, statesmen justify foreign policy on the basis of furthering the national interest of nation states. Acting as a guide, the national interests directs the attention of policymakers to a category of goals a state’s foreign policy ought to value most as its national and societal goals. These goals normatively must advance not just the interests of certain individuals or groups, rather it must promote the welfare of the country as a whole.[18]
In other words, the foreign policy of every country is at all times presumably designed to promote the national interest. Policy makers are laced with the task of identifying and serving the national interest in the policies they make for the state’s external interactions. Difficulties rear their head where there are conflicting interests regarding the national interest and a foreign policy decision as in the case of a clash of the interest in peace with the interest in respecting bilateral agreements. It thus behoves policy makers, especially foreign policy decision makers to bear in mind the concept of national interest as it aids prioritisation of foreign and domestic policies in the framework of national policy and provides the antidote against political myopia and partisanship that may present to the decision makers a false hue. “Finally, despite variation in meanings, national interests are the constant rather than the variables of international relations; it is likewise true that developments at home or abroad require a continual reassessment of those interests.”[19]

DIPLOMATIC FACEOFF
The exposition of national interest above renders a backdrop against which to examine the Yellow Fever/yellow card diplomatic tussle between Abuja and Pretoria. To adequately place it within the concatenation of events that both preceded and marked it, a brief section shall look at Yellow Fever in the region. Next, the adduced suppositions that may have causal implications for the undiplomatic action of the immigration authorities in South Africa towards the Nigerian passengers will be highlighted and immediately followed by an appraisal about the need for better relations between these two African nations.

Yellow Fever[20]
The Yellow Fever virus is an arbovirus of the flavivirus genus, and the mosquito is the primary vector. It carries the virus from one host to another, primarily between monkeys, from monkeys to humans, and from person to person. Several different species of the Aedes and Haemogogus mosquitoes transmit the virus. It is referred to sometimes as an acute viral haemorrhagic disease. The "yellow" in the name refers to the jaundice[21] that affects some patients.
Up to 50% of severely affected persons without timely treatment will die from Yellow Fever. There are an estimated 200,000 cases of Yellow Fever, causing 30,000 deaths worldwide annually. The virus is reportedly endemic in tropical areas of Africa and South America, with a combined population of over 900 million people. Over last two decades, the number of Yellow Fever cases has increased due to declining population immunity to infection, deforestation, urbanization, population movements and climate change.
There is no recognised cure for Yellow Fever. Treatment is at best symptomatic, aimed at reducing the symptoms for the comfort of the patient.[22] Vaccination remains the most important preventive measure against Yellow Fever. The vaccine is safe, affordable and highly effective, and appears to provide protection for 30-35 years[23] or more. The vaccine provides effective immunity within one week for 95% of persons vaccinated.
According to World Health Organization (WHO), there are 14 countries at risk of Yellow Fever transmission in West Africa. These include Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea and Guinea-Bissau. Others are Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.  These 14 countries are part of the International Health Regulations (IHR)[24] including all the Member States of the World Health Organisation. The aim of the IHR is to help the international community prevent and respond to acute public health risks especially those with the potential to cross borders and threaten people worldwide. One of the downsides of globalisation is that diseases can spread rapidly via international travel and trade. The health crisis in one country can impact livelihoods and economies in many other parts of the world. The aim of the IHR is to limit interference with international traffic and trade while ensuring public health by tackling the spread of diseases across borders. Furthermore, the IHR also requires that countries strengthen their existing capacities for public health surveillance and response.
Anyone travelling from any of those 14 countries mentioned above or in transit through any of such countries to any other country is required to tender proof of vaccination against the fever. The countries that require such proofs are those where the disease may or may not occur and where the mosquito vector and potential non-human primate hosts of Yellow Fever are present. Therefore, any importation of the virus into such countries by infected travellers could result in its propagation and establishment, leading to a permanent risk of infection for the human population. High fatality rates among the unvaccinated means that vaccination is recommended for all travellers visiting areas where there is a risk of Yellow Fever infection and transmission.
South Africa is one of the countries where the mosquito vector resides and where potential non-human primate hosts of Yellow Fever exists. Therefore, she has to take caution and ensure passengers from endemic countries are safe and not at risks to import the virus which could result in its propagation and establishment, leading to a permanent risk of infection for its human population.
Given this scenario, South Africa had cause to be wary of the travellers from the West of Africa.
That argument, though incontrovertible in isolation, flies against the face of reason when situated within the context of the ties that exist between both nations. As the Foreign Affairs Minister argued, appropriate diplomatic channels were ignored by the South African immigration authorities. Where necessary, if the fears were actual, the passengers should have been quarantined and inoculated at their expense. This would have been understandable, for the Federal Minister of Health, given the fact that there was no immediate endemic threat of the virus in Nigeria and Nigeria’s last case of the epidemic was in 1995. Nonetheless, if the deportation proved to be of extreme necessity, then the embassy ought to have been informed. Furthermore, suspicions of insincerity about the real issues at stake were heightened by the fact that the Nigerians who were deported had been issued valid visas for the trip and the process of obtaining such visas usually involved the prerequisite inclusion of valid International Certificates of Vaccination without which a traveller risked visa denial.
These issues necessitate an analysis of background factors that may have been at the root of this deportation embroilment.

Background factors
Long before this recent spat, not a few Nigerians, who were painfully aware of the individual and collective sacrifice of the country for the independence of South Africa, considered South Africans as ungrateful. This sentiment, often expressed in low tones, rose in crescendo during the xenophobic attacks in 2008. Many Nigerians lost friends and family to attacks that were unashamedly unprovoked and decidedly discriminatory. The pain can best be understood by a detour down memory lane.
Post-independence Nigeria’s primary African commitment was to liberate the continent from the last vestiges of colonialism and to eradicate apartheid in South Africa. This drive for African liberation had grown from a weak and conservative stance during the 1960s to an increasingly firm push after the civil war. Murtala Muhammad most actively pursued this Nigerian commitment after successfully backing the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola's (MPLA) ascent to power in Angola in 1975 by providing the swing vote in the Organisation of African Unity (OAU)[25] decision to recognize the MPLA. Nigeria had also played a similar role in the independence of Zimbabwe and the late 1980s saw her active in assisting Nambibia to achieve independence in Namibia. In the latter case, it contributed about US$20 million to assist the South West Africa People's Organization in the 1989 elections and other preparations for Namibian independence. The country also contributed financially to liberation movements in South Africa and to the front line states of Zambia, Tanzania, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe giving military and financial aid to the African National Congress (ANC) for its efforts against the apartheid regime in South Africa and provided military equipments to Mozambique to help its struggle against South African-backed guerrillas.[26]
Monies, resources and efforts that may have been put to use at home were being used to fight for the liberation of Africa and Africans across the continent. Though most Nigerians remain proud of their forthright stance against apartheid many more feel that post-apartheid South Africa shows insufficient gratitude for its role.[27] This sentiment was fiercely expressed again when the deportation news filtered through the airwaves. It was flagrantly obvious. South Africans were too ungrateful to bear.[28]
Adamu Adamu has laid this position of South African ingratitude to rest in a recent article.[29] Therein, he brilliantly argues against the continued resort to past assistance that indirectly serves to perpetually place the recipient of our generosity in a subservient position for life. Helping to liberate Southern Africa was a duty based on the truth that the continent will never be truly free until each country is independent. There must be freedom for all or none for any. Therefore, he averred, helping South Africa liberate itself is merely helping our own independence attain maturity and have meaning for us and for every victim of oppression. Is it for this that we want thanks?
Analogically, he enquires:
…what gratitude do we expect from the beneficiaries of our duty? How many times do we ask members of our family to bow down before us in thanksgiving for our feeding and protecting them? Moreover, even if this type of gratitude they seek is truly due from South Africa, do we have to remind them every day of what we have done to them? An act of kindness that expects--and especially if it does demand-an expression of gratitude becomes an unkind act, a painful gift that keeps its recipient an eternal prisoner to its benefaction.
That was certainly not what Nigerian patriots meant to do to South Africa in its hour of need…Nigeria stands in danger of vitiating its good works with those getting endless reminders, demands for, and expectations of eternal praise and constant honourable mention from beneficiaries of its goodness. In this and in all other things, goodness is its own reward and stands in no need for eternal thankfulness.[30]

With the incessant calls for gratitude from the South Africans quietened, the coast is clear to embark upon an exploration of other issues that remain pertinent to our goal here; issues that have pitted the South Africans at daggers drawn with Nigeria.

Permanent Seat at the United Nations Security Council
Nigeria has left no one in doubt about her intentions of securing a permanent seat with veto powers in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).[31] In that bid, South Africa is her principal rival.
The United Nations Organisation was established in 1945 at the end of the Second World War As part of their roles in the victory, the major allies negotiated themselves into the Security Council which is the most powerful organ of the UN because of the veto power wielded by its members. The Security Council is charged with the maintenance of peace and security among nations. Chapter 7 of the Charter empowers it to enforce the decisions of the body and it has the power to make compelling decisions on member governments. The Council is composed of five permanent members with veto and double veto powers including China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States of America; and other elected non – permanent members that run for two years.[32]
Barely 10 years into the formation of the UNO, calls were being made for change in its structure. The clamour for reforms have been particularly directed at the need to make the organisation more democratic and representative of the diverse peoples of the world. This it can achieve by increasing the number of permanent member of the UNSC to accommodate representatives of parts of the world that hitherto have not had such representation, like Africa. “In addition, the Security Council does not reflect the realities and challenges of global geopolitics. If any reforms should be implemented at the UN, they must include the restructuring of the membership of the Security Council.”[33] Two proposals were submitted by those charged with identifying how the required changes can be effected.
Proposal A recommends six additional permanent seats in the Security Council in addition to the current permanent five. It was assigned as follows; two to Africa, two to Asia, (Japan and India prescriptively), one to Europe (Germany prescribed) and one to Latin America (Brazil, prescribed). These new six were to also possess the veto power. Proposal B recommends creating eight rotating two-years term seat (non- permanent) with the four regions above having two seats each.[34]

While the G4, the four main aspirants for the new Security Council seats, are fine-tuning strategies for the realisation of their aspirations, the battle for a potential African seat on the UNSC has been a major source of contention between South Africa and Nigeria. The latter believes that as the most populous African nation, her permanent membership on the UNSC would more proportionately represent the African continent. South Africa, as the most economically advanced country in Africa, on the other hand contends that a seat for the “Rainbow nation” could signify increase economic possibilities for UN operations in Africa.

The Chair of the African Union Commission[35]
The position of the chair of the African Union Commission, held since 2008 by Gabonese Jean Ping, and other key posts in the Commission were expected to be filled by winners of fresh elections held in January this year. Those elections were postponed. The postponement was at the instance of South Africa’s insistence on a single tenure for holders of the position of chair. The implied thrust of this position is to render ineligible the incumbent whom many states in the continent believe performed creditably in his first term. Ping, who had served as Gabon’s Foreign Minister and as former president of the UN General Assembly,[36] had the backing of big continental players like Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya and the AUC host country, Ethiopia. South Africa’s insistence was predicated on her desire to present a consensus candidature of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) for the post in the person of Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, South Africa’s incumbent Minister of Home Affairs. On her part, Nigeria had cogent reasons for not supporting this bid.
Mr. Georges Chikoti, Foreign Affairs Minister of Angola, who presented the consensual choice of Dr. Dlamini-Zuma, had based her candidature on the argument that the SADC bloc had not had the opportunity on the level of the AUC to direct affairs. Contrary to that averment, it shall be recalled that the 8th Secretary-General of the OAU who is the longest serving of the organisation (from September 1989 to September 2001), Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim, was a national of Tanzania, an SADC member-state. “Chikoti’s claim was seen by many as a deliberate attempt by South Africa to create crisis where there is none.
Historically, the only sub-region yet to chair the pan-African organisation since the more than 50 years of existence is North Africa and if any state can legitimately insist on its turn, it should come from that sub-region whose members presently contribute close to 50% of the organisation's annual budget. It is thus dishearteningly unbecoming of South Africa to have created the sort of debacle that led to electoral deadlock and postponement. In addition, from a region whose member-national had had 12 unbroken years as chair of the OAU, such actions were least expected. For a level playing ground for all sub-regions, the Central African Region, which nominated Dr. Ping, should also be given an opportunity for a second term as provided by AU rules.[37] Ping also needs a second tenure, as is the practice globally, to consolidate on his achievements first time round most remarkable of which was the completion of a US200 million-dollar AU headquarters. Even Jacob Zuma himself recognises the need for consolidation of achievements and he is in the running for a second shot at the top spot.
By the nomination of Dr. Dlamini-Zuma, South Africa has violated the gentleman’s agreement by the Union’s leaders that the big five African countries[38] (Nigeria, South Africa, Libya, Algeria and Egypt, who also double as the main financiers of the Commission) should not contest for the Chair of the Commission. The agreement was to ensure that smaller countries were not dominated at the centre but were given leadership roles and sense of belonging. Only South Africa, the last to join has ever sought to occupy the seat.
Finally, there is an integrity issue at stake as well. Dr. Dlamini-Zuma is the ex-wife and mother of the children of incumbent South African president, Jacob Zuma. This singular fact, when juxtaposed with the foregoing, leaves a sour taste in the mouth and, as much as possible, ought to have been avoided. Instead, the president’s continuing push for his wife to clinch the position has turned the whole issue into a family soap opera which will set a bad precedence for subsequent AUC elections. Many now believe there is more to that pressure than is obvious. Some posit that Zuma’s efforts to ensure are aimed at covering-up his country’s recent diplomatic blunders in Libya and Cote d’Ivoire, while others claim Dlamini-Zuma is becoming a serious political threat to her former husband’s interests. She may become convinced to test her burgeoning popularity by contesting and even winning the presidency if she remains within the country’s politics. An outcome Zuma is wont to avoid.[39]

Nigeria’s Pro-Western Foreign Policy
There is a charge against Nigeria's foreign policy. It bears a strong Western slant. In her management of Africa's conflicts, Nigeria has exhibited features of pro-Westernness and maintenance of the status quo. This bent is, however, not a recent phenomenon. Aside from Angola where the General Murtala Muhammad's administration took sides with the pro-Moscow MPLA government,[40] most other interventions in Africa's conflicts have demonstrated Nigeria's preference for pro-Western perspectives.[41]
In the Congo, for instance, it supported the Kasavubu faction. That faction stood opposed to the Lumumba government which had the tacit backing of Communist Eastern Europe. It refused to recognise the Polisario Front fighting for the independence of the 'Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic' from Morocco. Again, during the Shaba I and II invasions of Mobutu’s Zaire, it supported Western military intervention and chose not to intervene in the seizure of power by the pro-Western Hissein Habre forces during the Chadian conflict, though it was part of the peacekeeping force.[42]
However, such a categorisation of Nigeria’s foreign policy is jaundiced. It fails to look at the entire picture but selectively qualifies the whole by an analysis of an unwholesome part. Several factors have conspired to determine Nigeria’s foreign policy right from independence in 1960. As the most populous Black country in the world, she has had to bear, wittingly or unwittingly, the leadership of the black world.  “This led to Nigeria’s feeling that she had a responsibility far beyond her borders.  Some might say beyond her means.” There was little doubt that the political leadership of the First Republic realized that the country had a legitimate claim to leadership and also that black people in Africa and the Diaspora looked up to Nigeria.
Although, in practice, the Republic of Ghana under Dr. Kwame Nkrumah (1909-1972) painted Nigeria as an inactive giant with feet of clay, yet Nigeria was not found wanting when it came to defending the interests of Africans still under colonial domination or in confronting France when they were determined to continue with the deadly injurious policy of testing nuclear bombs in the Sahara against the wishes of African people.
The internal political dynamics also contributed to the manner in which Nigeria behaved in the foreign arena.  As a federation of contending political persuasions, consensual position on foreign policy was the rule rather than the exception.  With the exception of the policy towards Israel which reflected the religious dichotomy between the North and the South, there was hardly any area of foreign policy in which the political parties differed.[43]

At any given time, a country’s foreign policy is intricately related to its domestic politics and national interests. By implication, therefore, a country’s national power has direct relevance to its foreign policy. These elements of national power afford several advantages to the country and are often key to streamlining her foreign policy goals and objectives. The country is big and relatively populous with about a quarter of Africa’s populations south of Sahara. This population constitutes an enticing market for foreign investment. Her size of and population has bestowed on Nigeria a strategic advantage. As has her geographical location in the middle Atlantic astride major trade routes making friendship with Nigeria desirable. Her agricultural and mineral potential remains competitive with wealth in minerals such as coal, iron, columbite, petroleum, uranium, bitumen and gas. The educated middle class on which a democratic regime could be built is considerably sizeable. The only drawbacks were lack of political direction and cohesion.[44]
However, South Africa’s view is understandable from the perspective of recent history. Events on the continent have had the governments of both states in opposing camps. In the leadership crises in Cote d’Ivoire, Egypt and especially Libya, Nigeria and South Africa differed in what they considered the appropriate response. That the Nigerian position tallied with the Western stand and that the South African government found itself “losing” out in the eventual outcome, supporting the “wrong horse” as one commentator put it, did not seat down well with the South African government. At the height of the political stalemate in Cote d’Ivoire, South Africa – one of the few states in the incumbent’s camp – caused a major upheaval that threatened the measure of solidarity in the ECOWAS organisation when it sent a warship to the region to signal its unequivocal support for the Gbagbo presidency. This was substantially excoriated by ECOWAS, behind which South Africa must have seen the hand of Nigeria. The situation did not differ too much in Egypt and Libya, where Nigeria’s position must have left South Africa aghast and thus fuelled the pro-Western tag pinned on Nigeria’s foreign policy.[45]

Leadership in Africa
By premising his argument about the root causes of the diplomatic situation between both countries on the fact that the deportation was merely a manifestation of a deeper objective, Professor and Director-General of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Bola Akinterinwa avows that South Africa both aims to assume the mantle of leadership in Africa and leap frog Nigeria to the UNSC seat. In her attempt at the former, she plans to undermine Nigeria. One method in the attainment of that singular goal, as the eminent International Relations scholar posits, is the “cheque-book diplomacy.” This method entails the debt settlement of African countries that are unable to pay dues due to the AU. As a result, South Africa generates political patronage especially outside the Southern African region. That alone could not have been anything outlandish in the political sphere but, as Akinterinwa evinces, this becomes a violation of one of the guiding principles of the AU which allows each region in the continent to solve its regional problems but refer to the continental organisation in matters that stretch beyond their native regions.[46]
Beyond that, however, lie other factors.
South Africa is increasingly being seen as the star of the continent. It boasts the highest GDP  ($363.7 billion in 2010) accounting for 24% of the continent’s GNP, with strong economic diversity in mining (almost 19% of the economy), manufacturing, agriculture, real estate, and financial services. Impressively advanced transportation and utility infrastructure plus 18-years of stable post-apartheid governance under a constitutional democracy combine to make South Africa the prime destination and an example of what an African state can be.  In fact, she has become the economic powerhouse of Africa. To concretise that assertion, she has been formally invited to join the Brazil, Russia, India, China (BRIC) quartet, and became a full member during the 2011 BRICS Summit in Hainan, and has been globally applauded for hosting the comprehensively successful 2010 FIFA World Cup.[47]
On the other hand is Nigeria with its predilection for self-destructive corruption, terrorism and infamously poor leadership. Despite all these, Nigeria has remained a reference for leadership in the continent powerful enough to present a virile competition for the Rainbow nation. One factor that has made this possible at all is size – expressed in terms of geography and population.
It must irk the South Africans to no end to know that because of the size factor, Nigeria has much more in common with the nations of the quartet than she does. The sheer size of Nigeria’s market and its potential for future economic growth and consumption more strategically coincide with the attributes of the quartet. With just about a third of the Nigerian population of approximately a 170 million, South Africa’s inclusion among the BRIC has been called into question by none other than the Goldman Sachs inventor of the now renowned acronym. Jim O’Neill expressed his displeasure by firstly stating that South Africa was included because the grouping failed to strictly base membership on economic fundamentals instead of pacts of political significance. “It is nowhere near constituting a BRIC, and without staggering productivity improvements and major immigration or improvements in birth rates, etc., it is never going to get there,” he said. He concluded by saying, “South Africa has played on the notion that because they do have developed markets and Western governing standards in some areas they’ve said, ‘Look, we are the gateway to the rest of Africa. (…) What intrigues me is whether other big African countries accept that and I doubt that Nigeria is going to be very happy about that.”[48]
It is in such and other means – linked with a particular yellow hue – that South Africa tries to assume for itself the leadership of Africa..

MIDDLE GROUND[49]
In seeking a middle ground for the relationship between the two countries, the concept of a ‘special relationship’[50] between the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US) is particularly instructive. In as much as Western phenomena cannot be blindly replicated in Africa due to different historical trajectories, there are undoubtedly important ideas that can be drawn from the historical alliance between both countries. South Africa and Nigeria have expressed no less a desire to transform the position of Africa in the global order.
Historically, Nigeria was one of the leading African countries in the anti-apartheid struggle as seen in her pivotal role in establishing the United Nations Special Committee against Apartheid in the 1960s. Also, in the involvement of ordinary Nigerians like students who contributed financially to the anti-apartheid movement in reaction to the 1976 Soweto uprisings and Nigerian civil servants who likewise offered portions of their salaries. Nigeria supported the Frontline States as well through the 1980s and by the end of apartheid in 1994, it had contributed an estimated US$61 billion towards the anti-apartheid effort.
The spat between Sani Abacha and Nelson Mandela in 1995 over the execution of environmental and human rights activist Ken Saro Wiwa presented the first test of how the two countries would engage each other as sovereign nations whose foreign policy portrays their national values. It was not until the arrival of civilian rule under Nigeria’s Olusegun Obasanjo in 1999 and the simultaneous election of Thabo Mbeki in SA that a strategic partnership emerged. There appeared to be something special about Sub-Saharan Africa’s largest economies’ determination to lead in the ‘African Century.’ A common sense of purpose emerged around the extinguishing of continental conflicts, reconstruction of the continent’s institutional architecture and the development of a continental socio-economic blueprint in the form of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD).[51]

As we enter the post-Yellow Fever era, this relationship is unsatisfactorily limping along. The Bi-National Commission (BNC) established in 1999 to facilitate the efficient management of the relationship has not met since 2009 soured by South Africa’s refusal to grant a visa waiver to Nigerian officials and diplomats. The BNC was supposed to convene in 2010 but those background factors enumerated above worked to prevent that from occurring. It is heart-warming that the government of both nations have now agreed to revive these annual talk-shops that discuss the possibility of strengthening economic and trade relations between the two states.[52]
During a roundtable on Nigeria’s foreign policy hosted by the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) and the Nigerian Peoples Democratic Institute (PDI) in Abuja in October of 2010, young Nigerian scholars and politicians wanted to know what the Nigerian people had to show for their country’s extensive involvement in continental and global peace-building, to which Nigeria has diverted billions of dollars since independence. Similar questions are being asked in South Africa.
Both countries have to define the overarching goal to which they are both staunchly committed. During the Cold War, Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan had to centre their ‘special relationship’ on the conviction that Communism was the biggest threat to their existence. Here, the common agenda that ought to be the conviction that poverty is a serious threat to the existence of both these countries. Poverty eradication is the critical precursor to changing the position of Africa in the global order. Neither country can export to the continent what it does not have at home.
There are obvious economic benefits for cooperation between both countries. South African firms like MTN, DSTv, Standard Bank, Protea Hotels, Shoprite, Woolsworth and Game have thrived in Nigeria and contributed towards employment, revenue generation and improved quality of goods and services. Likewise, Nigerian companies like Oando Nigeria and Dangote Group have made inroads into the Johannesburg Securities Exchange and the cement industry respectively, thus adding to SA’s investment appeal. This indicates that there can be a plethora of advantages for both countries, and the continent, should they decide on a special relationship with a goal in mind.
When pressed by the British media to redefine their special relationship with the US, British premier, David Cameron stated that the relationship remained “strong, because it delivers for both of us...this is a partnership of choice that serves our national interests today.” It is instructive to note that surveys have often shown the British public to be averse to playing second fiddle to the US. Nigeria and South Africa would do well to learn about the importance of taking citizens on board so that sharp practices by unpatriotic elements on both sides do not jeopardise the cordiality and thus limit the potential for decent and law-abiding citizens to benefit from this relationship. Nigeria and South Africa should, as a matter of urgency, accept their interdependence and resolve to handle diplomatic relations according to laid down procedures that will engender the flourishing of mutual respect. Only then can a special relationship begin to have more substantive meaning for the lives of ordinary South Africans, Nigerians and Africans as a whole.

Points to note
·         It is in her National Interest to request for a fresh Yellow Fever risk assessment from the WHO to fast track the removal of the country's name from the list of states given the fact that the last reported case was as far back as 1995.
·         As tenuous as it may have been for this to result in such an altercation between these two states, it is apposite for Nigeria to put measures in place to forestall a recurrence elsewhere which ought to begin with the dismantling of the ring of fake yellow card vendors in and around the airports.
·         The position of eminent laureate, Wole Soyinka, in his critique of Senghor's negritude is as apt here as it was point-blank in that instance. "A tiger does not boast about its tigritude. It simply pounces on the prey." A virile state needs not beat its chest in any challenge posed by another. Rather, the latter would, knowing well the "tigritude" of the former, apply restrain and seek all channels of diplomatic resolution to situations as and when they arise because the consequences may be dire should the former pounce. By implication, this happened in the first place because of the implicit and explicit perspective of Nigeria's position as a sleeping giant that has consistently failed to rise to its naturally bequeathed position of leadership in Africa.
·         Some hypothetical questions have been raised concerning the reciprocal reaction of the Nigerian government. Two of these are very poignant. Would the government’s response have been as quick and point blank as it turned out to be in achieving strategic gains such as the apology from the South African government had a Senator of the Federal Republic not been involved? Those who ask infer that the weight brought to bear on the Minister by the Senate was pivotal to the eventual outcome. Secondly, not a few wonder if the attention given to the matter by the press bore its mark in the end. In the end, many Nigerians wonder that if we may be witnessing the beginning of a new face to Nigeria’s foreign policy where her “tigritude” is front and centre.

CONCLUSION
The Yellow Fever case between South Africa and Nigeria may have come and gone but it remains a point of reference in the immediate historical trial of the relationship between these two African superpowers. A singular event though it was, it triggered off a series of actions that threatened to imperil not just the relationship between Nigeria and South Africa but the livelihoods of many who would have been caught up in the crossfire – had things degenerated out of control. It is to the advantage of the two states and the “efficient” diplomatic machinery at work that far worse scenarios did not play out but the situation was immediately brought under control and resolved with comparatively quick despatch. The formal public apology demanded of the South African government by Nigeria was pronounced  and a delegation from the former visited the latter to “smooth things over.” Several steps were taken most important of which was the resumption of the annual Bi-National Commission talk-shops between the two vice-presidents. Pretoria’s unprecedented support, projection and campaign for Nigeria’s Finance Minister is an indication that, to a large extent, the Yellow Fever’s row is over.
However, this paper, based on the conviction that the Yellow Fever incident was merely the manifestation of a series of covert underpinnings, strove to analyse the actions of the actors involved based on their national interests motivations. In accomplishing that, the paper examined the concept of National Interest as understood in International Relations and analysed the diplomatic faceoff between the two states providing as much evidence as is available on issues behind the news that may have forced the hand of the immigration authorities to inevitably “deport” the Nigerian passengers on board the Arik Airline on that fateful day.
In analysing National Interest, it was established that each and every state act in its action, reaction, inaction and interaction with other states can be construed as coming from the state’s criterion of what constitutes its national interest, at the time. When extrapolated to bear on this Yellow Fever instance, a wide array of possibilities open up for consideration. South Africa’s apology showed that Nigeria’s threat was not a "policy of bluff" but had telling consequences especially for their business concerns in the country.
However, such cloak and dagger encounters can best be avoided. As discussed the subsection Middle Ground, cooperation and mutual respect akin to the “special relationship” existing between the US and the UK ought to guide actions, reactions and interactions between these two erstwhile sister nations. Thus, both ought to eschew clandestine acts that undermine the authority of either and work together acknowledging the strength in numbers and the advantages of their interdependence to the promotion of the African agenda on the global arena. This is to the better advancement their national interests.[53]


[1] Known as the International Certificate of Vaccination or Prophylaxis, the yellow card is issued by health authorities of individual states. See: Kemi Ajumobi, Concern mounts over SA, Nigeria ‘Yellow Fever card’ imbroglio, http://www.businessdayonline.com/NG/index.php/analysis/126-health/34169-concern-mounts-over-sa-nigeria-yellow-fever-card-imbroglio, sourced 20th March, 2012.
“The press statement issued by Arik said South African health authorities gave the reason as incorrect or unrecognised batch numbers on the documentation which is mandatory proof before entry and described the protocol as "irregular and obfuscating” and accused the authorities of arbitrariness.” See: Ike Anya, On Yellow Fever, yellow cards, Nigeria and South Africa, http://www.nigeriahealthwatch.com/2012/03/on-yellow-fever-yellow-cards-nigeria.html, sourced 20th March, 2012 (Hereafter, “Ike Anya, On Yellow Fever, yellow cards, Nigeria and South Africa”).

[2] The Chairman of the House of Representatives on Diaspora Affairs, Abike Dabiri-Erewa tweeted that the action of the South African authorities was “unacceptable, pathetic, degrading, unfair and un-African.” See: Ike Anya, On Yellow Fever, yellow cards, Nigeria and South Africa.

[3] It quickly became a curious case of both approbation and reprobation, a contradiction in terms. For, if those very same certificates were considered valid enough to merit their holders a visa to travel to South Africa, how then did they become invalidated during the course of their journey to be refused by another agency of the very same government that considered them valid in the first instance? See comments under the report: John Ameh, Oluwole Josiah and Friday Olokor, FG faults S’Africa’s claim on Yellow Fever cards … deports 16 more South Africans, http://odili.net/news/source/2012/mar/7/828.html, sourced 20th March, 2012.

[4] Some reports put the total number of South Africans deported during the diplomatic furore at 136.
[5] The notion of the national interest soon came to dominate European politics that became fiercely competitive over the next centuries. It is a form of reason "born of the calculation and the ruse of men" and makes of the state "a knowing machine, a work of reason"; the state ceases to be derived from the divine order and is henceforth subject to its own particular necessities. States could now openly embark on wars purely out of self-interest. In fact, mercantilism can be seen as the economic justification of the aggressive pursuit of the national interest. “National Interest,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_interest, sourced 18th March, 2012.

[6] Michael G. Roskin, National Interest: From Abstraction To Strategy, www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub356.pdf, sourced 20th March, 2012 (Hereafter, Michael G. Roskin, National Interest: From Abstraction To Strategy).

[7] “Competition to define the national interest is often intense, because while the goals and values that a state may pursue are virtually endless, the same is not true for the resources needed to realize them. Decisions must constantly be made about which goals to emphasize and which to neglect. The definition given to the national interest is a major factor affecting which values will be favoured. This is because not all foreign policies (and, therefore, the values that they protect) are compatible with a given definition of national interest.” Ikedinma H.A., Foreign Policy Analysis, www.nou.edu.ng/noun/NOUN_OCL/pdf/pdf2/INR%20321.pdf (Hereafter, “Ikedinma H.A., Foreign Policy Analysis”).

[8] “National Interest,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_interest, sourced 18th March, 2012.

[9] Ikedinma H.A., Foreign Policy Analysis.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Michael G. Roskin , National Interest: From Abstraction To Strategy

[12] Idealism emphasizes international law, morality, and international organizations, rather than power alone, as key influences on international events. Idealists think that human nature is basically good and see the international system as one based on a community of states that have the potential to work together to overcome mutual problems. For Idealists, the principles of International Relations must flow from morality. Former United States president Woodrow Wilson was a major proponent of idealism. Joshua S. Goldstein and Jon C. Pevehouse, International Relations, Boston: Pearson, 2011, p. 43.

[13] It is pertinent to note that in reality national interest is conducted, directed or determined by the ruling class or the political elites. It is the power that the (incumbent government most times) that select, pursue, or operationalise what a nation’s national interest is. This explains why it varies as regime changes. For instance, Tunde Idiagbon/Muhammed Buhari’s regime in Nigeria between 1983 and 1985 considered it, the interest of the nation not to collect the International Monetary Fund (IMF) World Bank loan in spite of the parlous state of the Nigerian economy. However, the successor, General Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida’s regime in 1986 chose to contract the loan (despite its stringent conditionalities). See: Ikedinma H.A., Foreign Policy Analysis.

[14] Michael G. Roskin , National Interest: From Abstraction To Strategy

[15] Ibid. This will be treated later in this paper as it pertains to the crux of the Nigeria/South Africa spat.

[16] Michael G. Roskin , National Interest: From Abstraction To Strategy

[17] Ibid.
[18] Ikedinma H.A., Foreign Policy Analysis.It must be stressed however that the articulation of the goals does not necessarily guarantee the successful execution of foreign policy. The extent to which a foreign policy goal/objective is achieved depends largely on the quality, character and disposition of policy makers, the prevailing political and economic circumstances, the resource endowments of the state, the military capability, geographical location, population and a host of other factors.” Ikedinma H.A., Foreign Policy Analysis.
[19] Ibid. It is worth noting that there are some other issues bordering National Interests. Issues like National Interest versus Societal Interest (where a segment of society can come to dominate and control the policy process to the point where its views, and only its views, shape the content of foreign policy), National Interest versus Global Interest (where the near incompatibility of both has more, but not all, realists advocating for preferential consideration given to the latter rather than the former) and the Long-, Middle- and Short-term goals of National Interest are not explicated in full here. These areas of National Interested delineated here were considered pertinent to the term of this paper.
[20] Except otherwise stated, information in this subsection was obtained from this source: Dr Aminu Magashi, Nigeria: Yellow Fever - Beyond Diplomatic Fiasco, http://allafrica.com/stories/201203200498.html, sourced 20th March, 2012 (Hereafter, “Dr Aminu Magashi, Nigeria: Yellow Fever – Beyond Diplomatic Fiasco”).

[21] Refers to a yellowing of the skin and whites of the eyes.

[22] Known symptoms from range from nausea and vomiting to internal bleeding, meningitis, jaundice and eventual kidney failure.

[23] The Nigerian Minister of Health, Prof. Onyebuchi Chukwu, put it at 10 years.

[24] The International Health Regulations (IHR) is an international legal instrument that is binding on 194 countries across the globe.
[25] Now known as the African Union (AU)

[26] “FOREIGN RELATIONS” http://countrystudies.us/nigeria/80.htm, sourced 22nd March, 2012.

[27] John Campbell, South Africa and Nigeria’s Edgy Relationship, http://blogs.cfr.org/campbell/2012/03/12/south-africa-and-nigerias-edgy-relationship, sourced 20th March, 2012.

[28] “Passion was so inflamed that some Nigerians even urged their government to start demanding certificates from travellers from South Africa to show they were clear of HIV/Aids. Their misplaced argument was that South Africa was a major centre of the epidemic - with infection rates running at about 11% nationally - whereas Yellow Fever had been eradicated in Nigeria.” Sola Odunfa, African viewpoint: Yellow Fever and family demands, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17338672, sourced 20th March, 2012.

[29] Adamu Adamu, Nigeria: Endless Talk of Favours, http://allafrica.com/stories/201203230303.html, sourced 20th March, 2012.
[30] Ibid.

[31] In May last year, when the United Nations Secretary-General, Ban Ki-Moon, visited Nigeria, President Goodluck Jonathan minced no words to state categorically, “Mr. Secretary-General, given the realities of today’s world, a comprehensive reform of the UN system is imperative at this time… A situation where Africa is totally excluded from the permanent membership of the Council is unfair and untenable. It is therefore my hope that the UN system will support Nigeria’s quest for permanent membership of the UN Security Council.”
[32] A. S. Akpotor and P. E. Agbebaku, The United Nations Reforms and Nigeria’s Quest for a Permanent Seat

[33] Levi Obijiofor, Should Nigeria be a Member of the Security Council?, http://www.nigeriaplus.com/should-nigeria-be-a-member-of-the-security-council/, sourced 20th March, 2012.

[34] Ibid.
[35] Except otherwise stated, information in this subsection was obtained from this source: Alexander Ojo, South Africa and the election of AU Commission chair, http://www.dailytrust.com.ng/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=155905:south-africa-and-the-election-of-au-commission-chair&catid=14:international&Itemid=15, sourced 20th March, 2012.

[36] ‘How Nigeria can get AU commission chair’, http://sturvs.com/321005/‘how-nigeria-can-get-au-commission-chair’, sourced 20th March, 2012.

[37] South African president, Jacob Zuma, to divert attention from the crucial issues at hand tried to play the lingual card claiming that the issue was an example of the worn out tussle between Anglophone and Francophone African states. The truth, however, is that most states backing Dr. Ping’s tenure continuation are in fact Anglophone, even as he is from Francophone Central Africa.

[38] There is the suggestion in some quarters that Ethiopia, as the Headquarters of the Union and Union capital of the continent, should join this group as well.

[39] As can be seen from the information on this web page - http://www.home-affairs.gov.za/ - the Ministry of Home Affairs, headed by the very same Dr Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma who did not get the backing of Nigeria for the position of AUC chair and was responsible for the “bickering” that led to the indecorous postponement of those elections, is in charge of all immigration services. What implications this has for the causal factors of that singular case of undiplomatic deportations is crystal. There was indeed some bad blood and an odiferous stench of foul play.
[40] The Angolan situation where Nigeria supported pro-Soviet forces is explained by the fact that South African support for Biafran secessionist rebels during Nigeria's civil war decidedly influenced the Murtala Muhammad administration in supporting the MPLA forces in Angola.

[41] John Amfami Ayam, Review of Nigerian Foreign Policy Towards Africa: Continuity and Change by Akiba Okon, http://www.jstor.org/stable/161477, sourced 20th March, 2012.

[42] Ibid.
[43] Jide Osuntokun, Survey of Nigeria’s foreign policy -2, http://www.thenationonlineng.net/2011/index.php/columnist/thursday/jide-osuntokun/35374-survey-of-nigeria’s-foreign-policy-2.html, sourced 20th March, 2012.

[44] Ibid.
[45] South Africa cold reception of IMF’s Christine Lagarde  might also be a clear signal that unlike some countries in the continent like Nigeria, Ghana, Cameroun, Guinea and Chad, she was not in the least amenable to the  coercive preachments of Western “overlords” with the singular purpose of obtaining the necessary funds to sustain an ailing Europe. See: South Africa snubs IMF’s Christine Lagarde!,  http://www.newsrescue.com/2012/01/south-africa-snubs-imfs-christine-lagarde/#axzz1q9huzFlY, sourced 20th March, 2012.

[46] Chikodi Okereocha, Nigeria-South Africa Diplomatic Row: The Morning After, http://www.tellng.com/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=1192:nigeria-south-africa-diplomatic-row-the-morning-after&Itemid=125, sourced 20th March, 2012.

[47] James Kimer, Nigeria-South Africa Diplomatic Spat Highlights Growing Regional Rivalry, http://www.nigeriaintel.com/2012/03/09/nigeria-south-africa-diplomatic-spat-highlights-growing-regional-rivalry, sourced 20th March, 2012 (Hereafter, “James Kimer, Nigeria-South Africa Diplomatic Spat Highlights Growing Regional Rivalry”).
[48] Ibid.

[49] Except otherwise stated, the information in this subsection is from this source: Dr Ngwenya, Giants of Africa Limp Along – South Africa and Nigeria, http://www.saiia.org.za/sa-foreign-policy-african-drivers-opinion/giants-of-africa-limp-along-south-africa-and-nigeria.html, sourced 20th March, 2012.

[50] The phrase ‘special relationship’ was coined by former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill in 1946. It is underpinned mainly by a common historical, political and economic vision. Churchill saw it as the embodiment and promotion of values shared by the two major English-speaking powers. At its best, the relationship facilitated co-operation to end World War II and at its worst, it culminated in George W Bush and Tony Blair launching an illegal war in Iraq. It has endured through various Republican and Democratic administrations in the US and Tory and Labour governments in the UK.
[51] Dr Ngwenya, Giants of Africa Limp Along – South Africa and Nigeria, http://www.saiia.org.za/sa-foreign-policy-african-drivers-opinion/giants-of-africa-limp-along-south-africa-and-nigeria.html, sourced 20th March, 2012.

[52] The potential of the BNC cannot be overstated, especially when viewed with regard to the possibility of combining resources and intelligence to fight transnational crime. Crime and immigration concerns are some of the areas that affect South Africa/Nigeria relations and so concerted efforts to addressing these issues would provide opportunity for the two states to deepen cooperation and promote economic development. Uyo Salifu, South Africa-Nigeria Tensions: Whither Cooperation for Common African interests?, http://www.igd.org.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=138:south-africa-nigeria-tensions-whither-cooperation-for-common-african-interests&catid=18:in-focus&Itemid=1, sourced 20th March, 2012.
[53] It should be noted that though efforts were made not to mention it in this paper, South Africa has its fair share of the poor and its cadre of corrupt politicians.

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